NAMES AND INDEXICALS ARE NOT TYPE REFERENTIAL

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Résumé

Dans son examen des termes singuliers dans « Direct Reference » (1993), François Recanati utilise le concept de type-référentialité et de token-référentialité pour distinguer les noms propres et les indexicaux des descriptions définies. Recanati postule que les noms propres et les indexicaux incarnent la référentialité de type, alors que les descriptions définies ne l'incarnent pas, ce qui permet de traiter les utilisations référentielles des descriptions définies comme token-référentielles, et les utilisations attributives comme générales. Cet article remet en question le cadre de Recanati en argumentant contre l'hypothèse de la type-référentialité des noms propres et des indexicaux. En explorant des exemples systématiques de non-référence impliquant à la fois des noms propres et des indexicaux, l'étude conteste la notion dominante selon laquelle toutes les expressions de ce type requièrent une référence. Les résultats contribuent à une compréhension nuancée des diverses fonctions et interprétations associées aux noms propres et aux index dans la philosophie et la linguistique.

Abstract

In his examination of singular terms in "Direct Reference" (1993), François Recanati employs the concept of type and token referentiality to distinguish proper names and indexicals from definite descriptions. Recanati posits that proper names and indexicals embody type referentiality, while definite descriptions do not, enabling the treatment of referential uses of definite descriptions as token-referential, and attributive uses as general. This paper challenges Recanati's framework by arguing against the assumed type-referentiality of proper names and indexicals. Through an exploration of systematic non-referential instances involving both proper names and indexicals, the study contests the prevailing notion that all expressions of this kind necessitate reference. The findings contribute to a nuanced understanding of the varied functions and interpretations associated with proper names and indexicals in philosophy and linguistics.

1. What is referentiality?

Referentiality is a postulated linguistic or semantic property of certain expressions in natural language. If an expression is directly referential, it can only be used to express a singular proposition.[1] The question I wish to consider in this paper concerns the semantics of proper names and indexicals. Is referentiality an intrinsic characteristic of them? Do proper names and indexicals differ in this respect from definite descriptions? My discussion will be structured around François Recanati's affirmative responses to these questions.

According to Recanati, "[a] referential term is rigid 'de jure'; it is, in Mill's terminology, 'attached to the object itself', independently of its properties, and so cannot fail to denote the same object in all possible worlds, since what changes from world to world is not the object itself, its identity, but only its (contingent) properties." (Recanati 1993, 12). It is not highly contested that certain uses of some expressions are in this sense referential, for example deictic uses of indexicals. However, Recanati puts forward a much stronger thesis: not only

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[1] In this paper, the terms 'referential' and 'directly referential' are used interchangeably.

are certain uses of some terms referential, but some terms themselves are referential. His objective is "to distinguish proper names from definite descriptions, at least in their [descriptions'] non-referential uses" (Recanati 1993, 11). Below, I will introduce Recanati's proposal for characterizing referentiality by deploying his distinction between type- and token-referentiality.

1.1 Type- and token-referentiality

While definite descriptions have both referential and non-referential (attributive) uses, proper names and indexicals are posited as referential terms. He explains the difference as follows:

> "[D]escriptions are not referential terms, even though they can be used referentially. Their referential use is a matter of fact, whereas demonstratives, indexicals and proper names are linguistically 'marked' as referential. This is the difference between 'type-referentiality' and mere 'token-referentiality'. An expression which is type-referential *can only be used referentially*, to express a singular proposition, while an expression which is not type-referential can be used either referentially or non-referentially, depending on the context of utterance." (Recanati 1993, 300; emphasis added)

When a term is type-referential, or simply (directly) referential, we are thus entitled to assume that all tokens of that term are referential. Recanati proposes the following definition of what it is to be a referential term:

> "(TR) A term is (type-)referential if and only if its linguistic meaning includes a feature, call it 'REF', by virtue of which it indicates that the truth-condition (or, more generally, satisfaction-condition) of the utterance where it occurs is singular.
> The truth-condition of an utterance G (t) is singular if and only if there is an object x such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies G ( )." (Recanati 1993, 17)

Utterances with referential terms thus express singular, object-dependent propositions, "with the referent of the referential term as a constituent" (Recanati 1993, 292). This does not imply that referential terms lack descriptive meaning. On the contrary, according to Recanati, "referential terms [...] have a descriptive meaning, namely what I called the 'linguistic mode of presentation' of their reference" (Recanati 1993, 296). The difference with non-referential terms is that, due to the presence of the feature REF in their linguistic meaning, that descriptive content is truth conditionally irrelevant (1993, 312).
Token-referentiality is characterized in opposition to type-referentiality: "When a non-referential expression (e.g., a definite description) is used referentially, the context, not the sentence, indicates that the (intended) satisfaction-condition of the utterance is singular. This is what I call 'token-referentiality'" (Recanati 1993, 24 fn15).

1.2. What constitutes the type of a singular expression? Methodological assumptions

Recanati does not define or explicitly characterize what he means by a "type" in the context of a singular expression. Therefore, in this paper, I will also refrain from attempting such a definition, relying instead on an intuitive understanding of the type/token distinction, much

as Recanati does. However, a crucial methodological requirement is that a type cannot be defined by referencing the kind of semantic contribution an expression makes in a particular use. This requirement follows from the desideratum to distinguish possible type-referential terms from definite descriptions, which are considered to be only token-referential; namely, only one kind of their uses (the referential use) is token-referential. Otherwise, one could argue that definite descriptions are also type-referential by insisting that the divergent propositional contributions of a definite description in its referential and attributive uses – the former as an object, while the latter as an individual concept – demonstrate that the two uses belong to different types.

Since Recanati considers type-referentiality to not merely be a theoretical construct, possibly unrealized in natural language, but takes it to be a feature of the linguistic meaning of some expressions – the referential terms (1993, 16; compare also 31) – it is possible to test his thesis. In the following sections, I will argue that neither proper names nor indexicals are type-referential in the sense specified by Recanati (1993).

Clearly, relying solely on morphology would not be an effective approach for identifying types in the context of the type-referentiality thesis, given that different homonymous words can share the same form. In principle, any word can be used as a proper name provided it is introduced into a language in an appropriate way. Since we do not want common nouns that share a form with a name, as illustrated by:

(1) Rose is not a rose.

to be considered counterexamples to the type-referentiality thesis, it is necessary to provide an argument explaining why the examples discussed in the following sections should be viewed as uses of a single word.[2]

I propose two arguments for treating deictic, anaphoric, bound, deferred and descriptive uses of an indexical as instances of one word. The first is due to Levinson, who argues from crosslinguistic perspective for such treatment of deictic, anaphoric and bound uses: "the fact that in language after language all three functions can be performed by the same pronominal expressions suggests that their semantic character simply encompasses all three." Levinson does not explicitly address deferred and descriptive uses of indexicals; however, these uses are recognized as potential counterexamples by Recanati himself (1993, ch. 16). Therefore, their classification as belonging to the same type as deictic uses of indexicals should not be considered problematic.

Recanati focuses almost exclusively on individual uses of proper names; therefore, my argument for considering other systematic uses of names, such as anaphoric, deferred, descriptive, and predicative uses, is independent of his analyses. The association of various senses with a single morphological form can indicate either homonymy, as in example (1) above, or polysemy. In cases of homonymy, the divergent senses are associated with different words, whereas in polysemy, they are linked to a single word. Evidence for polysemy includes close content relationships between the different senses of a word (Chomsky 2000, Falkum 2011, Dölling 2021). It is these content relationships that I intend to rely on in my arguments for treating individual, anaphoric, deferred, descriptive, and predicative uses of a proper name as uses of one word. The examples I will present below are linked to the standard individual uses of proper names through meaning and/or inferential patterns. Anaphoric uses of names, at least those discussed below, rely on the same name-bearing property that is integral to the linguistic meaning of a proper name in its individual use, as outlined by Recanati. The interpretative mechanisms for deferred and descriptive

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[2] I am grateful to a reviewer for suggesting that I expand the discussion on type identity.

uses explicitly depend on the individual uses of the relevant names (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 below). Although predicative uses of names do not depend on individual uses in the same manner, there are inferential connections between them. Thus, from (2):

(2) Frida is painting.

we can infer (3):

(3) At least one Frida [person called `Frida'] is painting.

This would constitute a case of equivocation, if the two tokens of Frida were tokens of two homonymous words. Predicative and individual uses of proper names also share the name bearing property as part of their linguistic meaning. All the examples of uses of proper names and indexicals that I will explore are systematic, meaning they are based on productive underlying interpretive mechanisms that apply to any name or indexical under specific contextual conditions. I propose that the crosslinguistic availability of various kinds of uses of proper names and indexicals, along with their related content and inferential interconnections, supports treating those systematic uses of both names and indexicals that share a morphological form as typologically identical.

2. Systematic kinds of uses of indexicals

If indexicals were referential expressions in the sense specified above, their propositional contribution at the level of what is said in all their uses should be an object. In this section, I will examine several kinds of systematic uses of indexicals, such as deictic, deferred, descriptive, and anaphoric uses.[3] I will argue that while deictic and deferred uses of indexicals comply with the type-referential constraints, the propositional contribution of indexicals in their descriptive uses is general (i.e. not singular). I will also show that since anaphoric uses of indexicals are semantically parasitic on their antecedents, the kind of propositional contribution of anaphoric uses of indexicals is strictly dependent on the semantic kind of those antecedents: if the antecedent is an expression used referentially, the propositional contribution of the anaphor is also such. However, since indexicals may be anaphoric on definite descriptions used attributively, the propositional contribution of an anaphorically used indexical may also be general.

2.1. Deictic uses of indexicals

In "Demonstratives," (1989) Kaplan explicitly restricted his investigations to those uses of indexicals in which "the referent is dependent on the context of use and [...] the meaning of the word provides a rule which determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the context" (Kaplan 1989, 490). Russell (1940) used the term 'egocentric particular,' and Reichenbach (1947) 'token reflexive' for such uses. In this paper, following many authors (e.g. Nunberg 1993, Braun 2017), I will call Kaplanian uses of indexicals 'deictic.' They form the paradigmatic examples of expressions used referentially, as exemplified by (4)[4]:

(4) I am right and you are wrong.

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[3] Some indexicals also have systematic bound uses, but I will set them aside in this paper.
[4] This example is based on one in Barwise and Perry 1983.

The proposition expressed by this sentence, as uttered by A, is true iff A is right (about a contextually salient issue) and the addressee, B, is wrong. If the proposition is, in fact, true, the same sentence as uttered by B to A in the same context will be false. Recanati follows Kaplan in treating deictic uses of indexicals as directly referential and in characterizing the linguistic meaning of an indexical as including a rule constraining the choice of the referent in the context of use. According to Recanati, "the linguistic meaning of an indexical expression refers the hearer to a relation R which is supposed to hold in context between the expression and the reference" (1993, 140), and "an indexical expression t in an utterance S(t) indicates that: There is an object x which is F (= linguistic mode of presentation), such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies S( )." (1993, 140). The latter claim is Recanati's formulation of direct referentiality. That deictic uses of indexicals are directly referential is widely assumed in the literature following Kaplan's and Recanati's works, and I grant it here.[5] Yet, in contrast to Kaplan, Recanati's direct referentiality thesis, by being strengthened to type-referentiality, is not limited to deictic uses of indexicals. In the following sections, I will examine deferred, anaphoric, and descriptive uses of indexicals to see if they can all be considered directly referential.

2.2. Deferred uses of indexicals

The first systematic treatment of deferred uses of indexicals is Nunberg's "Indexicality and Deixis" (1993). In order to account for indexical utterances in which the speaker refers to one object by pointing at another, as in:

(5) He is my favourite philosopher,

said while producing a picture of Kripke, Nunberg distinguished between an index (the object being pointed at) and the (deferred) referent (the object the speaker intends to talk about, typically not present in the context). The index is the object distinguished by the linguistic meaning of the indexical (for pure indexicals) or by demonstration (for demonstratives), and the deferred referent is related to the index by a contextually salient relation.[6] The important difference between deictic and deferred use of 'he' is that only the former requires the presence of the referent in the context. Unless 'he' in (5) is anaphoric on preceding discourse, the sentence cannot be used with reference to Kripke in 2023, when he is no longer alive. However, producing Kripke's picture and thus relying on a relation between pictures and persons depicted in the pictures enables reference to Kripke in contexts where he himself is not present.[7] If the linguistic mode of the presentation of 'he' is something like 'the contextually salient male', deictic use requires that the male be either antecedently salient or demonstrated, while in deferred uses, the male is made contextually salient with the help of an object related to him (the picture). Still, in one sense, the important requirement of direct referentiality may be considered fulfilled:

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[5] For an alternative view see e.g. Elbourne 2005.

[6] Nunberg imposed linguistic constraints on the uses of indexicals to count as deferred, which go beyond referring to one object with the help of another. However, these constraints will not be relevant for the argument presented here.

[7] It is also possible to refer in a deferred way to a fictional character: e.g. by saying 'She is my favorite villain' said while pointing at a poster depicting Cruella de Vil from the movie *101 Dalmatians.* Depending on a theory of fiction, there may be doubts about whether this use of 'she' is referential in the sense required by the type-referentiality thesis. However, in this paper, I will set aside the potential reference to fictional characters and therefore will acknowledge that deferred uses of indexicals are referential.

in deferred reference, an indexical expression 'he' in an utterance S(he) indicates that: There is an object x which is F (= the contextually salient male), such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies S( ).

In the case of (5), iff Kripke is the speaker's favorite philosopher.

In (5), the referent is an individual object, and the proposition expressed is singular, in compliance with the type-referentiality thesis. However, in (1993), Nunberg insisted that the deferred referent may be an object or a property. In this way, he hoped to account for utterances in which the propositional contribution of the indexical is general. I will reserve the term 'deferred reference' for cases where the deferred referent is an object and discuss the other cases in Section 2.4 under the heading of 'descriptive uses of indexicals.' Before doing so, I will discuss anaphoric uses of indexicals in the following section.

2.3 Anaphoric uses of indexicals

Anaphoric uses of indexicals are parasitic on tokens of other expressions, called their antecedents, both for their propositional contribution and for the semantic kind of that contribution. In a paradigmatic case, an object is referred to by an expression, and a pronoun picks up that reference, as in:

(6) Sally arrived, but nobody saw her,

where the name 'Sally' (the anaphoric antecedent) refers to a particular woman, and the propositional contribution of 'her' is the same woman. The use of 'her' is referential because such was the use of 'Sally'.

However, indexicals may be anaphoric on non-referential terms. Here is an example by Partee (Partee 1970, 367):

(7) John was looking for the man who murdered Smith and Bill was looking for him too.

Assuming that neither John nor Bill (nor the speaker) knows who murdered Smith, the definite description that is the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun 'him' is used attributively, and the propositional contribution of 'him' is general (the individual property of being the murderer of Smith). The propositional contribution of anaphoric pronouns is thus fully dependent on that of the antecedent, and for that reason the use of the anaphoric pronoun inherits the (non)referential character of the antecedent. Since definite descriptions are not type-referential for Recanati, it should be expected that anaphoric uses of indexicals with definite descriptions as antecedents may form counterexamples to the type-referentiality of indexicals. I suggest that (7) shows that those with attributively used descriptions as antecedents do form such counterexamples.

Recanati does not discuss anaphoric uses of indexicals in (1993), and in (2005), where he does, the issue of type-referentiality is not explicitly considered. This might suggest that he does not consider anaphoric uses of pronouns to be uses of indexicals. Such a move does not necessarily immediately lead to trivializing the type-referentiality thesis, as long as we allow that some non-deictic uses of expressions from Kaplan's list ('I,' 'you,' 'here,' etc.), other that anaphoric uses, are also considered uses of indexicals. I have already considered deferred uses of indexicals and suggested that they support the type-referentiality of indexicals. But there is one more systematic kind of use of indexicals to be considered.

Below, I will consider descriptive uses of indexicals which are characterized by a general propositional contribution. Recanati definitely is willing to include descriptive uses among indexical uses, as the term 'descriptive indexical' is coined by him, and he discusses those uses as a potential counterexample to his thesis. He is not disqualifying them solely on the basis of them being non-indexical and as such irrelevant.

2.4. Descriptive Uses of Indexicals

Descriptive uses of indexicals are instances where indexical utterances express general propositions (with respect to the indexical).[8] Once we have characterized descriptive uses in this way, it seems that there is not much to argue about because descriptive uses of indexicals are defined as such, whereby general instead of singular propositions are expressed by a sentence containing the indexical. Thus, Recanati, to save his type-referentiality thesis concerning indexicals, has three options: (i) to claim that, after all, descriptive uses of pronouns are really not indexical, (ii) to deny that there are descriptive uses of pronouns at all, or (iii) to claim that also descriptive uses are, in some sense, referential. Although Recanati argues for a singular interpretation in some specific cases of what Nunberg presents as descriptive uses of indexicals, he does not propose this move as a general strategy. Rather, he accepts that in some cases, the propositional contribution of the indexical is general but argues that those uses are, in one sense, referential as well (strategy (iii)).

Recanati claims that all indexicals, including indexicals in their descriptive uses, are referential at the basic level of interpretation. And that it is at this level that the direct reference theory should be tested. It may seem controversial why a particular level of interpretation should be so privileged, but I will accept this for the sake of argument and argue that, in general, descriptive uses of indexicals cannot be treated as referential, even at Recanati's basic level.

To show this, I will rely on two examples of descriptive uses of indexicals. The first is Nunberg's "pope" example (Nunberg 1992, see also Recanati 2005), understood as a discourse initial utterance:

> (8) He is usually an Italian. [uttered by someone gesturing towards John Paul II as he delivers a speech with a Polish accent shortly after his election.]

Intuitively, in (8), 'he' does not refer to the Pope himself, who, as it is clear from the context, is not Italian, but contributes the property of being the Pope to the general proposition expressed: *Most popes are Italian*. The second is Schiffer's (1981) example:

> (9) He must be a giant. [uttered while pointing at a giant footprint on a beach]

In (9), 'he' does not *refer* to anybody, as the person who left the footprint is not present in the context, but instead contributes the property of being the person who left this footprint to the general proposition expressed: *The person who left this footprint, whoever he is, must be a giant*. According to Recanati, the interpretation of descriptive uses of indexicals follows a pattern similar to other indexicals. He postulates three levels of interpretation for linguistic expressions. The first level is the level of descriptive linguistic meaning. According to Recanati, the meaning of indexicals includes the feature REF, which specifies that indexicals are interpreted by an object (or a *de re* concept) at the second level. It is the level

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[8]As Recanati put it: "Non-basic interpretations such as those involved in Nunberg's examples [...] themselves constitute 'what is said' by the utterances which give rise to these interpretations" (1993, 316).

of saturation at which indexicals get referents. For deictic uses, level 2 is the final level of interpretation. But for descriptive uses, Recanati claims, the interpretation proceeds beyond the level of saturation, and the referent is replaced by a general concept associated with the referent.

Recanati calls this process of replacement that takes part at the second level a process of synecdochic transfer because of the part-whole relation that obtains between the descriptive general concept and the *de re* concept associated with the initial referent obtained by saturation at level 2 (1993, 315). Recanati contrasts this interpretation pattern with that of definite descriptions:

> "the basic level interpretation of a description is a descriptive concept (that which is expressed at level 1), while the basic level interpretation of an indexical is - at least in part - an object (that which is indicated at level 2). To be sure, from the object which is (part of) the interpretation of the indexical at the second level we may go, through transfer, to another object or to a property. At this (third) level there occurs the possibility of a descriptive - or even attributive - use of the indexical, but this is clearly not on the same footing as the descriptive use of a description. *The descriptive use of the indexical presupposes a more basic, referential interpretation,* whereas the attributive use of a description is basic and does not presuppose a prior referential interpretation." (Recanati 1993, 315-16; emphasis added)

To illustrate, let us return to example (8):

> (8) He is usually an Italian.

Here, the REF component of the meaning of the indexical forces us to look first for the referent, in this case, John Paul II. The interpretation process does not stop at this point because of the inadequacy of this interpretation (the speaker does not ascribe the property of being an Italian to a person he knows is not Italian, and, most importantly, the quantifier 'usually' requires a range of objects to quantify over, not one object). Instead, John Paul II is replaced at level 3 by the concept of being the Pope, which is a part of the de re concept of John Paul II. As a result, it is the concept of being the Pope that contributes to the resulting proposition: *The Pope is usually an Italian or Popes are usually Italian*, which is the expected result.

According to Recanati, levels 1 and 2 are mandatory for the interpretation of indexicals, while level 3 is optional, and the basic level of interpretation is "the level of interpretation which is reached when no optional p-process [pragmatic process] occurs" (Recanati 1993, 315). Each level presupposes the previous level as a step in interpretation. Because, in agreement with the REF component of the meaning of the indexical, the process of interpretation goes through the process of saturation at level 2, Recanati claims that, from the point of view of level 2 - the basic level - this use of 'he' is referential. As indicated in the quote above, Recanati contrasts this type of interpretation with the interpretation of definite descriptions, for which there is no transfer to an object or a *de re* concept at level 2 but only at the optional level 3. As a result, at the basic level 2, the interpretation of a definite description is still descriptive, which makes definite descriptions not type-referential.

This interpretation of descriptive uses, even though it worked for example (8), does not generalize, however, as example (9) shows:

> (9) He must be a giant.

The interpretation here cannot proceed via the process of saturation at level 2, because the potential referent of the indexical is, by hypothesis, not present in the context. Instead, the interpretation goes via the footprint, to a property of an object that is in a salient relation to the footprint, i.e., the property of being someone who left this footprint. The footprint, however, is not referred to by any expression in the sentence but is contextually demonstrated. Thus, example (9) shows that saturation at level 2 is not mandatory for the interpretation of descriptive uses of indexicals - in (9), the pronoun 'he' is not saturated - and this seems to falsify Recanati's claim. Example (8) was misleading because of the coincidence that the object that helped in the interpretation of the indexical – John Paul II – was at the same time a potential referent for 'he'. But example (9) shows that it does not have to be the case. Descriptive indexicals can be interpreted regardless of whether their default referents are available in the context or not. Their interpretation is general and does not necessarily proceed via the process of saturation. I conclude that descriptive uses of indexicals cannot be uniformly interpreted as referential at the basic level of interpretation. Even though the interpretation of examples such as (9) does not proceed through the saturation of the indexical included in the utterance, in some sense, it does rely on a particular object being indicated, and possibly a modification of Recanati's strategy might lead to compliance with a modified version of the type-referentiality thesis. There are, however, uses of indexicals, which may be called attributive, that do not depend on an identification of any particular object. I will discuss them below.

2.4.1. Are there systematic attributive uses of indexicals?

Recanati distinguishes, following Nunberg, a particular kind of descriptive uses of indexicals: "when the interpretation of an indexical is a 'property' (or 'role'), the indexical is said to be used descriptively, and it can be said to be used attributively if the role or property in question is that which the indexical conventionally expresses, i.e. the property which an object must contextually possess in order to be the referent (linguistic mode of presentation)" (Recanati 1993, 320). The terminology mimics the attributive uses of definite descriptions, in which the relevant content is the linguistic meaning of the description. In the case of 'you', the concept expressed in attributive uses would be 'the addressee/the person to whom this utterance is addressed', while for 'I', it would be 'the speaker'. Even though Recanati acknowledges the possibility of attributive uses of indexicals, from his type-referentiality thesis concerning indexicals it follows that their attributive content is not truth-conditionally relevant:

> "What characterizes referential terms as opposed to descriptions is that one must go beyond the descriptive concept, because of REF. REF imposes the step from the linguistic mode of presentation, which is descriptive, to the psychological mode of presentation, which is not, by signalling the truth-conditional irrelevance of descriptive content, hence the *de re* character of the thought expressed by the utterance." (Recanati 1993, 297)

The one example of attributive use of an indexical Recanati considers ('I might have been a communist', 1993, 301),[9] is explained away by suggesting a possible singular interpretation,

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[9] This example, originally cited by Nunberg (1990), occurs in a scene from Peter Weir's movie "The Year of Living Dangerously," where a reporter investigating arms shipments for local communists in Sukarno's Indonesia receives a warning from his interlocutor. The intended meaning is 'the person to whom you are addressing these questions might have been a communist,' indicating an attributive use of 'I'.

which, as such, would comply with type-referentiality. I will not argue here against his interpretation but will highlight a class of uses of indexicals not often mentioned in the literature,[10] i.e., the uses of indexicals in proverbs. I suggest that they form a class of attributive uses of indexicals, whose interpretation does not proceed through the identification of any particular object but follows directly from the content that is part of the linguistic meaning of the indexical.

2.4.2. Indexicals in proverbs

Indexicals contribute properties rather than objects to the propositions expressed when they are used in sentences interpreted as proverbs. Proverbs by their very nature express general rules or truths and do not concern just particular cases. In typical instances of descriptive uses, such as (8), indexicals do not contribute their linguistic meaning to the proposition expressed but rather some other property which is saliently related to the object demonstrated or indicated by the linguistic meaning of the indexical in this particular context. But proverbs are special by aiming at general content and forcing their interpretation to abstract away from particular contexts. Not being able to rely on specific features of a particular context, we are left with the content available in the linguistic meaning of an indexical, which explains why indexicals with rich linguistic meaning, such as first and second person pronouns or words such as 'today' or 'yesterday' are especially susceptible to use in proverbs and for attributive interpretation.

To illustrate, I will use Kaplan's example, which he attributes to Thomasson and leaves unanalyzed,

(10) Never put off until tomorrow what you can do today.

There are three indexicals in this sentence: 'tomorrow', 'you', and 'today'. Already the use of the adverb of quantification 'never' points to the descriptive interpretation of 'tomorrow' and 'today', but recognizing the sentence as a proverb makes the reader additionally aware that the interpretation should not rely on particular features of the context of use, which would be what we do in typical cases of descriptive interpretation. Yet, if we abstract from individual occasions of use, what is left for 'you' is the property that is common to all addressees of the sentence, i.e., the property of being the addressee (of a proverb), i.e., the linguistic meaning of 'you'. This property contributes to the proposition expressed, making this descriptive use of the indexical attributive. In a similar way, 'today' contributes the property of being `the day of utterance' or 'the present day', and 'tomorrow' - being the following day, resulting in *One* (the addressee of the proverb = any human) *should never put off until the following day what one can do on the present day*. The metaphorical aspect of 'the following day' (as well as of 'the present day'), which stretches the sense of the phrase to 'the future', I leave here unanalyzed.

The important difference between other descriptive uses of indexicals and anaphoric uses is that while the former seem to rely on particular objects being indicated in the context of utterance, even if not on saturation of the indexicals themselves, the interpretation of attributive uses of indexicals in no sense depends on the identification of particular objects and is thus even further detached from singular interpretation (see Kijania-Placek 2016).

2.5. Are indexicals type-referential?

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[10] One notable exception is Kaplan (1989), whose example I will analyze below. Kaplan (1989, 510)

I have argued above that indexicals follow the (TR) pattern proposed by Recanati as a characterization of referentiality in their deictic and, to some extent, deferred uses. They are also directly referential when anaphoric on a term used referentially. However, anaphoric pronouns with non-referential antecedents (such as attributively used definite descriptions) do not contribute objects to the propositions expressed. Above, I have tentatively suggested that anaphoric uses could be explicitly excluded from consideration, on the ad hoc basis that Recanati did not consider them explicitly in the context of type-referentiality of indexicals. But such a move is not really compatible with relying on the intuitive notion of the type/token distinction, which is based on the morphological form of an expression, for the obvious reason that deictic 'he' shares the form with anaphoric 'he'. If we were ready to restrict type-referentiality only to some uses of an expression individuated by form, the same move would be in principle available for claiming that also definite descriptions are type-referential on their referential uses. To block that move, Recanati would need to provide us with an alternative definition of a type, such that would distinguish between deictic and anaphoric pronouns while retaining attributive and referential descriptions as one type in a non-question begging way.

There is no doubt, however, that Recanati considers descriptive uses of indexicals to be possible counterexamples to the simple formulation of the type-referentiality thesis, or to the direct reference theory concerning indexicals itself, because he explicitly proposes amendments to it[11]:

> "If Nunberg is right, indexicals and (presumably) other referential terms can be used descriptively to express general rather than singular propositions. This means that the theory of direct reference, in the crude form in which it has been stated so far, works only for those cases in which no process of deferred reference occurs. This constitutes an indisputable weakening of the theory, but, as I shall argue now, the weakening in question must be considered as an elaboration or sophistication of the theory rather than a threat to its basic claims. [...] If Nunberg is right, there are two levels in the contextual interpretation of indexicals. At one level, which I call level 2 (level 1 being that of linguistic meaning), the indexical indicates an object; the interpretation of the indexical at this level is what the theory of direct reference says it is - either an object (strong theory) or an object under a truth-conditionally irrelevant mode of presentation or type of mode of presentation (weak theory). At the next level - level 3 - the interpretation is a 'target' (possibly a role or property) reached through transfer from the object indicated at the previous level." (Recanati 1993, 312)

The central thesis of the amended version of the direct reference theory is "the thesis of the asymmetry between referential and non-referential terms with respect to their possible uses. It is true that both indexicals and descriptions can be used either referentially or descriptively. [...] Yet, at the basic level, indexicals must be given a de re interpretation, contrary to definite descriptions." (1993, 314) This amended version of type-referentiality still requires that for the interpretation of indexicals saturation is mandatory. I have argued that the interpretation of (9) does not require the saturation of 'he'. I have additionally pointed out a specific class of uses of indexicals - their uses in proverbs - whose interpretation does not proceed through saturation. In the following section, I will turn to

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[11] In this quote, and in other places, Recanati uses the phrase 'deferred reference' in the extended sense, which encompasses both deferred and descriptive uses of expressions. See section 2.2 above.

proper names, which, together with indexicals, were supposed to show that type-referentiality is "a semantic feature of natural language." (Recanati 1993, 31)

3. All the (systematic) faces of proper names

Treating type-referentiality as a semantic feature of natural language, in contrast to a theoretical postulate defining a class of expressions possibly not exemplified by any natural language expression opens up the natural question of whether proper names, as used in natural language, are, in fact, type-referential. In the following investigation of proper names, I align with Recanati's claim that "[c]ontemporary philosophers of language study language as it is rather than language as it ought to be; when it comes to proper names, they try to capture the characteristic features of those words which are called 'proper names' rather than the features of the words which deserve to be so-called." (Recanati 1993, 177). The question I will thus ask in this section is if it is true for all systematic uses of proper names such as 'Gareth Evans' that "the reference of a particular token of 'Gareth Evans' is the person who is related to the name type 'Gareth Evans' by a name-convention operative in the context of utterance of this token." (Recanati 1993, 141). I will examine individual, deferred, anaphoric, descriptive, and predicative uses of proper names in turn. To anticipate the conclusion, my answer will be that only particular kinds of uses of proper names could be considered referential, but if type is understood with reference to the form of an expression, i.e. independent of the kind of use of a name in a particular token, proper names as used in natural language are not type-referential.

3.1 Individual uses of proper names

By an individual use of a proper name I mean its default, typical use, which is often called a 'referential use' in the literature. I will not deploy the term 'referential' due to an obvious clash of terminology in the context of discussing the type-referentiality of proper names. Although historically the debate on the semantics of individual uses of proper names was fierce, many researchers now agree that proper names in their individual uses are referential (but see section 3.5 below). I will neither discuss nor defend the thesis here, as my general arguments against the type-referentiality of proper names do not depend on it. I thus accept Recanati's proposal concerning the linguistic meaning of proper names, if we take it as restricted to individual uses, according to which:

> "By virtue of its meaning, a proper name NN indicates only that there is an entity x such that an utterance S(NN) is true iff x satisfies S( ). NN also indicates which entity y is such that y = x, but this indication is not part of the meaning of the name: it is conveyed by the name by virtue of an extralinguistic convention, namely the convention which associates NN with its bearer." (Recanati 1993, 138)

Additionally, I accept that:

> "Even if [...] name-conventions are extralinguistic, the fact that there are such conventions has to be treated as somehow a linguistic fact. The fact that a proper name has a 'bearer' - a semantic value directly assigned by virtue of a convention, e.g. the convention that 'Cicero' refers to Cicero - is part of what defines the category of proper names, in contrast to other categories of singular terms, such as pronouns. It is not necessary to know the bearer of a name to be linguistically competent, but it is necessary to know what a proper name is, and

this involves recognizing that a proper name is supposed to have a 'bearer'." (Recanati 1993, 139; compare also 143)

It thus follows from the linguistic meaning of a proper name 'N' that its referent, in individual use, is a bearers of the name 'N'.[12] Since names in natural language do not have a linguistic restriction as to how many bearers they may have, and reusing a name is rather a rule than an exception, allowing the property of bearing 'N' as a part of the linguistic meaning of the name makes Recanati's meaning of proper names akin to Kaplan's concept of character for indexicals, and Recanati himself calls his view indexical (1993, 139). Characterized in this way, proper names in their individual uses clearly support the thesis of type-referentiality of proper names, and my arguments against the thesis will rely on other systematic uses of those expressions.[13]

3.2. Deferred uses of proper names

Although Nunberg suggested that proper names do not have deferred uses (Nunberg 1992), Recanati argued that "deferred reference is a phenomenon which, far from being limited to indexicals, can be illustrated with any type of referring expression whatsoever" (Recanati 1993, 312). I share Recanati's inclusive view. The same type of crosslinguistic arguments Nunberg used in defense of a deferred character of some uses of indexicals can be deployed to argue that some uses of proper names can be considered deferred in the sense specified in section 2.3 above, i.e. where an expression is used in reference to one object with the help of another object indicated by the linguistic meaning of the expression (Kijania-Placek and Banaś 2021).
As is the case with some demonstratives (like 'these' or 'those', see Nunberg 1993, 24), part of the linguistic meaning of a proper name 'N' (the property of being a bearer of 'N') constrains the choice of an index, while the name's grammatical features (if any), as well as linguistic constraints of other parts of the uttered sentence, may also constrain the choice of the referent. The phenomenon can be illustrated by means of the following example:

(11) My parents protested during Vietnam.

The preposition 'during' requires an eventive constituent, thus prompting the deferred interpretation of the name. As a result, the country is not the referent of this use of 'Vietnam' but is the index, relating the country to a salient event connected with it – the Vietnam War. The war is the deferred referent of this use of the name and its propositional contribution.
Strictly speaking, (11) does not fall under Recanati's characterization of the linguistic meaning of proper names because there arguably is no linguistic convention linking the proper name 'Vietnam' to the event on a par with its link to the country. Instead, the name 'Vietnam War' in common English and some more specific names in Vietnamese (as well as in historian's English) are appropriately linked to the event. Still, as I suggested for deferred uses of indexicals above, the general requirement that there is a particular object on which the proposition expressed by (11) is dependent, which may be considered the core of direct

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[12] Recanati additionally claims that "For each proper name there exists in principle a social convention linking that name to a definite individual, called its bearer. This individual is the referent of the name. This linguistic convention is a general convention, the same for all proper names." (Recanati 1993, 139) I do not find his argument that there is only one convention for all proper names convincing, but since nothing hinges on this claim, I will leave it aside in this paper.
[13] Again, I exclude fictional names from consideration in this paper. Arguably, they could provide additional arguments against the type-referentiality of proper names.

referentiality, is retained, and I believe deferred uses of proper names should be considered referential in this extended sense. Additionally, the same argument Recanati used to show that deferred uses of indexicals are referential at the basic level of interpretation would work in the case of proper names because it is a requirement of the deferred use that the default referent of the name - which serves as an index in deferred reference - be first identified. I conclude that deferred uses of proper names do not undermine the type-referentiality of proper names. Below, I will turn to anaphoric, descriptive, and predicative uses of proper names,[14] not all of which can be so accommodated.

3.3 Anaphoric uses of proper names

As is the case with indexicals, anaphoric uses of proper names are characterized by their semantic dependence on another expression, which serves as the antecedent of the anaphora, influencing both the type of propositional contribution and its exact value. In principle, we should thus expect both general and singular propositional contributions, as we have seen above for indexicals. An anaphoric use of a proper name can be illustrated by the following example by Geurts (1997):

(12) I have a poodle named 'Horace'. Horace is three years old.

An object was introduced in the first sentence by the property of bearing the name 'Horace', and the same object is the propositional contribution of the use of the name in the second sentence. In this case, a concrete object is truth-conditionally relevant, and it is additionally explicitly given by the convention that is connected with the name through its linguistic meaning. In this sense, (12) falls squarely into the type-referentiality schema. In other examples given in the literature, the name-bearing property is less explicit, but still, the anaphoric relation is arguably based on it, as in (13)[15]:

(13) A Mary and a Paul joined the Diogenes Club yesterday. Mary is a very nice person.

The use of 'Mary' in the second sentence is anaphorically dependent on a specific use of an indefinite description,[16] and is thus arguably singular, even though the content of the name 'Mary' in the antecedent is that of a predicate (see Section 3.5 below on predicative uses of names). But in (14), given by Elbourne (2005):

(14) If John insists on calling his next son Gerontius, then his wife will be annoyed and Gerontius will get made fun of because of his name.

the content of the antecedent – an attributively used definite description – is not object-dependent, and neither is the propositional contribution of the anaphora.
Several similar examples given earlier by Burge (1973) point to the same anti-type-referential conclusion:

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[14] Proper names arguably also have bound uses, where the interpretation of the name is correlated with the arguments in the extension of the restrictor of the (possibly implicit) quantifier that does the bounding, as illustrated by the example, 'In every family with children named after the Osmonds, Donnie misbehaves.' (Gray, 2018). I will omit bound uses in these investigations, as nothing in my argument depends on the specifics of this case.

[15] Rami 2014a and 2014b. Similar examples are given in Elbourne 2005, Burge 1973, Geurts 1997, and Rami 2015.

[16] In the sense of Karttunen 1976.

(15) The shortest spy in the 21st century will be Caucasian. Call him 'Bertrand'. (That) Bertrand will also be bald.
(16) Someone cast the first stone. Whoever he was, call him 'Alfred'. (That) Alfred was a hypocrite.

They resemble what Evans called 'descriptive names', i.e., names whose content was introduced by a description. Since I believe (14)-(16) can be treated as a use of a descriptive name and Recanati explicitly defended his theory against descriptive names, I will discuss them separately below.

3.3.1. Descriptive names as a special case of anaphoric uses of proper names

Evans introduced the term 'descriptive name' for names whose reference is fixed by means of an attributive definite description. In the last three examples from above, it is, respectively, 'John's next son', 'the shortest spy in the 21st century', and 'the person who cast the first stone'. Evans's original example is 'Julius', stipulated to denote the person who invented the zip (Evans 1982), while 'Jack the Ripper' and 'Neptune' are attested examples. Recanati admits that in such cases "*de facto* the referent of 'Julius' is thought of descriptively, because it is known only by description," but he claims that "this is consistent with the fact that, qua proper name, 'Julius' requires that its referent be thought of non-descriptively" (1993, 177-178). Recanati insists, I believe rightly and consistently with his orientation on types, that it is the same name 'Neptune' that was first introduced as a descriptive name and later used with reference to the planet, once it was observed, because names are not individuated by what we know about their bearers (Recanati 1993, 179-180). Yet a natural conclusion from such a stance would seem to be that the name 'Neptune' is used non-referentially as a descriptive name and referentially when used with reference to the same object after the empirical discovery. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the type-referential character of proper names, however, and Recanati tries to resist it. What he offers as an argument is the following idea:

> "it is a mistake to think of a descriptive name such as 'Julius' as being essentially (or intrinsically) descriptive. The fact that its referent is known only by description is purely contingent. Far from being essentially descriptive, a name such as 'Julius', like any other proper name, *demands* that its referent be thought of nondescriptively. If we use a descriptive name rather than a description, this is precisely because *we look forward* to a richer state of knowledge in which we will be able to think of the referent nondescriptively. A descriptive name such as 'Julius', 'Neptune', or 'Jack the Ripper' is created only in the *expectation* that more information about the bearer will accumulate, thus eventuating in the possibility of thinking of the latter non-descriptively. This possibility is simply anticipated by the use of a descriptive name." (Recanati 1993, 180, fn. 15; emphasis added)

I leave it to the reader to decide how convincing the postulated for descriptive names "demand" that its referent be thought of nondescriptively is in saving type-referentiality of proper names. I remain unconvinced, partly due to a lack of specification regarding how we should introduce the demands and anticipations into the meaning of a name. The understanding of (16), in particular, does not seem to require the appreciation of such anticipation. In the next section, I will discuss uses of names in cases where there clearly is

no anticipation of a referential use. Those uses are inconveniently also called 'descriptive' in the literature, so we have to be cautious: Evans's cases are cases of descriptive names, while below I will discuss descriptive *uses* of names.

3.4. Descriptive uses of proper names

As with descriptive uses of indexicals, descriptive uses of proper names involve propositional contributions that are general, representing a distributive property. Unlike individual uses, the semantic value of a proper name in such instances is predicative, and unlike descriptive names, the property is not necessarily (and usually is not) an individual property. Analogous to indexicals, there are two classes of proper name uses with predicate-type propositional contributions: one where the property is contextually related to the (contextually) distinguished bearer of the name, and the other relying on the linguistic meaning of the name, i.e., on the name-bearing property. These two kinds of uses of proper names have different underlying interpretation processes and were historically rarely connected. For that reason, I will reserve the term "descriptive use" for the former kind. Following the terminology introduced by Recanati for indexicals, which in turn relied on Donnellan's distinctions concerning definite descriptions, it would be natural to call the latter kind "attributive use," but uses of proper names whose propositional contribution is the property of bearing the relevant name are consistently called "predicative" in the literature, and I will retain this terminology when discussing them below.

Various types of descriptive (non-attributive) uses of proper names were distinguished in the literature, mostly in reaction to predicativism – a theory of proper names according to which proper names are predicates signifying the multiply applicable property of bearing the relevant name in all of their occurrences, including as singular arguments in subject position (see below). Critics of the unified interpretation of proper names pointed out that even when proper names indeed signify predicates, their content does not have to be the name-bearing property. Typical counterexamples are the names of artists used for their artworks (so-called Artwork Examples), as in (Jeshion 2015a):

(17) Every Puccini has been performed this year.

Here, the propositional contribution of the name is the (distributive) property of being an opera by Giacomo Puccini and not an artwork named 'Puccini'. Other cases include Family Examples (Böer 1975; compare also Jeshion 2015a or Davis 2005):

(18) Waldo Cox (my gardener) is a Romanov.

Resemblance Examples (Jeshion 2015b; compare also Fara 2015b):

(19) Two little Lenas just arrived. [where `Lenas' refers to two daughters of Lena resembling her physically]

Representational Examples (Jeshion 2015a; compare also Matushansky 2015, Bach 2015, and Rami 2015):

(20) Two Obamas came to the Halloween party.

or Machiavelli Examples (Fara 2015b; compare also Fara 2015a, Burge 1973, Böer 1975, Bach 2002, Davis 2005, Matushansky 2015, Hunter 2010, Leckie 2013, Jeshion 2015a, b, Napoli 2015, and Sæbø 2015):

(21) Dick is a real Machiavelli.

What all these uses have in common is the interpretation structure: like in deferred uses of proper names, the interpretation process relies on the object that is the (contextually and socially) distinguished bearer of the proper name as a starting point but moves on to a property of/related to that object, and it is the property that contributes to the proposition expressed (Kijania-Placek 2023). For (17), the interpretation process relies on Giacomo Puccini being the socially distinguished bearer of the name 'Puccini'. Since Giacomo Puccini is an individual and the quantifier 'every' requires a range of objects to quantify over, the singular interpretation is excluded at the level of linguistic meaning of the sentence due to this inconsistency, and a descriptive interpretation is considered. The name contributes the property of being an opera by Giacomo Puccini, resulting in *Every opera by Giacomo Puccini has been performed this year*.

In contrast to indexicals, where the interpretation of a descriptive use may rely on a property related to an object not indicated by the linguistic meaning of an indexical but by demonstration, in the case of proper names, the process always proceeds through the intermediate step, which requires identification of the relevant bearer of the name. If speakers do not recognize Giacomo Puccini as the relevant bearer of the name 'Puccini', they will not be able to properly interpret the utterance of (17). This is strictly relevant to the type-referentiality thesis concerning proper names. Although even in simple sentences, like (22):[17]

(22) Aristotle is on the top shelf.

it is not the case that (22) is true iff Aristotle himself is on the top shelf, Recanati is nevertheless right that this interpretation process has to proceed through the level of saturation of the name, from which we move to the property related to Aristotle (the property of being a book by Aristotle). It follows, perhaps a bit surprisingly, that descriptive uses of proper names, in contrast to indexicals, comply with the amended version of the type-referentiality thesis, according to which expressions are type-referential iff their interpretation is referential at the basic level of interpretation (see section 4 below). This conclusion cannot be extended, however, to predicative uses of proper names, an issue to which I now turn.

3.5. Predicative uses of proper names

For a long time, research on proper names has been concentrated solely on their individual uses. In the second half of the 20th century, both linguists (Sloat 1969) and philosophers (Burge 1973) have pointed out, however, that proper names also have systematic uses in which their propositional contribution is the name-bearing property that mentions the relevant name. As Burge indicated, proper names take the plural, form noun phrases with quantifiers as well as with definite and indefinite articles, as in (Burge 1973):

(23) Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.

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[17] This example is from Napoli 2015.

or

> (24)   An Alfred joined the club today.

Burge suggested that even individual uses of proper names, as in

> (25)   Alfred studies in Princeton.

should be analyzed as predicates, with the addition that in argumentative positions names are complex demonstratives with an unpronounced 'that' phrase. This idea gained traction at the beginning of the 21st century, with papers by Fara (2015a, b), Matushansky (2008, 2015), Elbourne (2005), and many others, who replaced 'that' with the definite article. Their theory is known in the literature as predicativism about proper names. In this paper, I will put aside the unificatory aspects of predicativism and will consider predicative uses of proper names as such in the context of the type-referentiality of proper names.

Recanati did not consider predicative uses when arguing for the type-referentiality of proper names, but it seems undeniable that the propositional contribution of a predicative use of a proper name does not exhibit the relevant object dependence required by a simple formulation of referentiality. When we claim that (example based on one in Schoubye 2018):

> (26) Sam can be a woman.

or

> (27) Sascha in Russia is male, but in the US most likely is a woman.

we do not express an object-dependent proposition, which is true iff (in the case of 23)) a particular person called 'Sam' has the modal property of possibly being a woman. Rather, we express a general proposition that among the bearers of the name 'Sam,' there can be females. The more interesting question is, however, if Recanati can claim that even in predicative uses proper names are referential at the basic level of interpretation.

In most cases, an expression becomes a proper name by being introduced to the language in the performative act of naming an object. In such a baptism, an object is linked to a name (type) and becomes a bearer of the name. Most formal and informal baptisms rely on reusing existing names, but from a purely linguistic point of view, i.e., disregarding social and legal regulations, any existing or newly coined word can be used as a name. In such cases, at the same time, a name type is formed, and a particular object is established as its bearer. In both cases, the possibility of a predicative use of a proper name is dependent on its introduction to the language for the purpose of an individual use. There is thus a close connection between individual and predicative uses of a name. Still, during the baptism itself, the name is only mentioned and thus is used neither predicatively nor referentially. It follows that even in typical cases, predicative uses are possible without prior individual use of the name. And even if predicative uses of a particular name required not just introduction through a naming ceremony but additionally an individual use of that name, the interpretation of a predicative use would not proceed through saturation of the name. It can be seen in predicative uses of commonly used names, for the interpretation of predicative uses of which the speaker is not required to identify any particular bearer of that name, or even to be able to ascertain if there are any, as in (28):

(28) There are more Johns than Gerontiuses.

Additionally, predicative uses of proper names may be enabled through social practices that are not individual naming ceremonies, like when a list of prospective names is introduced by a decree. In a community in which it was stipulated that a new proper name may only be created by changing the first letter of an existing name, 'Dolin' in (29) would have a felicitous predicative use:

(29) There are many Colins but there are no Dolins yet.

And if (29) were true, it would have excluded that there were any individual uses of 'Dolin' previously. This seems to establish that predicative uses of proper names are not semantically dependent on referential uses (compare also Sainsbury 2015, Kijania-Placek 2023). More importantly, the interpretation of predicative uses even in cases where prior individual use of a name is assumed (e.g., the predicative use of 'Colin' in (29)), does not require saturation, because even in such uses, no identification of a particular bearer of the name is required. I conclude that predicative uses of proper names constitute a counterexample to the type-referentiality of proper names, even in its weakened formulation.

3.6. Are proper names type-referential?

I have accepted without further argument that typical individual uses of proper names are referential and also argued for the referentiality of deferred uses of names. Although not strictly referential, the descriptive uses of proper names turn out to be dependent on individual uses and are thus, in a sense, referential at the basic level of interpretation, i.e., their interpretation must proceed through the identification of a distinguished bearer of the name. However, the referentiality of anaphoric uses of proper names is strictly dependent on the semantic type of their antecedents, and only anaphoric uses with referentially used antecedents are referential.

Anaphoric uses of names with non-referential antecedents are akin to Evans's descriptive names, which, as Recanati admits, have descriptive propositional contributions, and their interpretation does not require, and in fact, for many uses, in principle, excludes the identification of the referent - we use descriptive names, or names anaphoric on attributively used definite descriptions precisely when we do not know the identity of the relevant person or object. Recanati attempted to account for the purported referentiality of descriptive names by alluding to those names "demanding" referential use or speakers using descriptive names in anticipation of a future referential use. If successful, such an account could probably be extended to anaphoric uses of names with non-referential antecedents. It is not clear, however, how to incorporate these demands and anticipations into either the linguistic meaning of proper names or to the definition of referential terms itself.

The one class of uses of proper names that is resistant even to the possible weakening of the definition of referentiality by alluding to demands and anticipations are predicative uses of names. Predicative uses do not presuppose individual uses, and their interpretation is not dependent on an identification of any referent of the names. Felicitous predicative uses of proper names are possible even in the absence of any former individual use of a name.

Since in most cases names are used predicatively in (syntactically) predicative positions (e.g. with articles or quantifiers), one possible reaction to predicative uses is to claim that the type-referentiality thesis (TR) is formulated for names' occurrences in atomic sentences and that there are no such predicative occurrences of proper names (that even (23) is, in fact, an

occurrence within the scope of a modal sentence). Such a move, however, again prompts the question of what makes particular tokens of expressions tokens of the same type. I have left this question unanswered, as Recanati does, relying on pretheoretic clues based on form, that would, however, classify occurrences of 'Alfred' in (24) and (25) in one type. If the type-referentiality thesis is to be distinguished from mere token-referentiality, it should concern all tokens of a specific type. If predicative uses of names do not have tokens in strictly atomic sentences, minimally it follows that a definition of referentiality based on atomic sentences is not adequate for judging if they comply with it. Additionally, Recanati's considerations about the identity of names, which he offered in the context of descriptive names, seem to support the conclusion that a predicative and an individual use of 'Julius' are uses of the same name: "[t]he claim I am criticizing entails that there are two distinct homonymous names 'Neptune' (or 'Julius'), one belonging to the category of descriptive names and the second to the category of ordinary names. I see no reason to accept this. It seems to me – as it does to common sense – that there is only one name, which was first introduced when its referent was known merely by description" Recanati (1993, 179-180).[18] Extending Recanati's argument to descriptive uses of proper names, it follows that predicative uses of proper names, and possibly anaphoric uses based on non-referential antecedents, testify against the type-referentiality of those expressions.

4. Are Indexicals and Proper Names Type-Referential? Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have examined Recanati's type-referentiality thesis as applied to indexicals and proper names. From the outset, I have accepted that both deictic uses of indexicals and typical individual uses of proper names (usually called just referential uses) are indeed referential. These expressions in both uses align with the basic, initial formulation of the type-referentiality thesis, reiterated here:

> (TR) A term is (type-)referential if and only if its linguistic meaning includes a feature, call it 'REF', by virtue of which it indicates that the truth-condition (or, more generally, satisfaction-condition) of the utterance where it occurs is singular.
> The truth-condition of an utterance G (t) is singular if and only if there is an object x such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies G ( ).

This general formulation does not explicitly include the condition that the relevant object, the referent of an expression, is constrained or determined by the linguistic meaning of the expression. However, this understanding follows from formulations specifically pertaining to indexicals and proper names. For indexicals, Recanati requires that the object x mentioned in (TR) in the context satisfies the descriptive content, which, together with REF, forms the linguistic meaning of an indexical. The descriptive content specifies a relation, supposed to hold in the context between the expression and the referent (1993, 140). For proper names, the additional requirement is that the referent is determined by an

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[18] One potential objection to classifying individual and predicative uses of names as belonging to the same type is the argument that expressions from different syntactic categories should possibly be considered as distinct types. In response, I would like to highlight that cross-categorical alternations are typically viewed as instances of polysemy, thus representing uses of a single word type. For example, consider the treatment of the phrases 'a fine line between hope and despair' versus 'to line a page' in Carston (2021). More crucially, however, it is possible for predicative uses of proper names to occur where the names do not appear in syntactically predicative positions. An example is provided in (27), with other instances including 'Muhammad Ali used to be Cassius Clay' (Bach 2015) and 'In most Danish families, Kim is male' (Schoubye 2018); see also Bach (2002). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to address this objection.

extralinguistic convention that associates the particular token of a name with one of its bearers and it is part of the linguistic meaning of a proper name that there is such a convention (Recanati 1993, 138). The basic formulation of type-referentiality should thus be supplemented by these requirements:

> (TR-1) = (TR) + the object x (the referent of a referential term) is determined in the context of utterance by the relevant relation specified in the linguistic meaning of the term

Both deictic uses of indexicals and individual uses of proper names also satisfy the strengthened formulation of type-referentiality – (TR-1). For instance, (4) uttered by Sam to Bill:

> (4) I am right and you are wrong.

is true iff Sam (the speaker) is right and Bill (the addressee) is wrong, and (30) uttered by Sam with pointing to Bill:

> (30) He is my favorite philosopher.

is true iff Bill (the male salient in the context or demonstrated) is Sam's favorite philosopher. Similarly for proper names:

> (31) Kripke was a philosopher of language.

is true iff Saul Kripke (the socially default, at least in philosophy circles, bearer of the name 'Kripke') was a philosopher of language.
However, neither deferred uses of indexicals nor of proper names satisfy (TR-1). In a context in which Kripke is not present and not otherwise salient, one cannot refer to him by saying 'He is my favorite philosopher,' because he is not an object satisfying the required relation of being the male salient or demonstrated in the context of the utterance of 'he.' But in the same context, Kripke can be a deferred referent, providing a different object is demonstrated in the context, one which is in contextually salient relation to Kripke. Such an object could be a picture depicting Kripke or his book. Neither the picture nor the book is the referent of 'he' because those objects do not meet the requirement of being male, as stipulated by the linguistic meaning of the pronoun and intuitively, they are not the intended referents. Kripke does not satisfy the requirements either because he is not present in the context and thus not demonstrated. Still, in an extended sense, Kripke is the relevant object mentioned in (TR), and the proposition expressed by (5), i.e., in the context where the sentence is uttered while the speaker is producing a picture of Kripke:

> (5) He is my favorite philosopher

is true iff Kripke is the speaker's favorite philosopher. So the literal content of (TR) is satisfied: (5) is true iff there is an object x such that the utterance is true if and only if it is the speaker's favorite philosopher. I conclude that deferred uses of indexicals satisfy the literal, weakened formulation of (TR), which I dub (TR-2):

> (TR-2) = (TR) taken literally, without the implicit requirement that the referent satisfies the descriptive requirements imposed by the linguistic meaning of the expression

Similar reasoning demonstrates that deferred uses of proper names are not referential in the sense of (TR-1) but are (TR-2)-referential. In a museum of wax figures, Clinton can refer in a deferred way both to his own and to Charlie Chaplin's figures by (32):[19]

> (32) I am next to Chaplin.

This deferred use of the name 'Chaplin' is not (TR-1) referential, because (32) is true iff Chaplin's figure is next to Clinton's figure, but it is Charlie Chaplin himself who is linked by the relevant social convention to the name 'Chaplin,' not this particular figure of him. But (32) is (TR-2) referential because there is an object x (the contextually salient Chaplin's figure) such that the utterance is true if and only if Clinton's figure is next to it.

Also, anaphoric uses of indexicals with referential antecedents are not (TR-1)-referential but are (TR-2)-referential, and for analogous reasons. Unless we propose that the linguistic meaning of 'she' is disjunctive and includes the descriptive condition of being a contextually salient or demonstrated female OR an object referred to by the anaphoric antecedent, which I do not think Recanati does, (6) will not satisfy (TR-1):

> (6) Sally arrived, but nobody saw her.

(6) is true iff Sally (the contextually distinguished bearer of the name 'Sally') arrived and was not seen by anybody, not iff the contextually salient or demonstrated female satisfies the properties referred to in (6). This sentence may be felicitously uttered in a context in which no female is salient prior to the utterance and none is demonstrated. (6) satisfies (TR-2) since Sally is the relevant object.

The situation is different with anaphoric uses of proper names which are based on referential antecedents. Here the name is anaphoric on an expression containing or mentioning the same name and inherits the extralinguistic link to a specific bearer introduced by the anaphoric antecedent, as in (12):

> (12) I have a poodle named 'Horace'. Horace is three years old.

If not for the first sentence, no bearer of 'Horace' would be distinguished. By the rule of anaphora, this use of the name is linked to whatever bearer of 'Horace', in this case, the speaker's poodle, is distinguished by the antecedent. For that reason, not only there is an object x (the poodle) such that the utterance is true if and only if it is three years old, but the object is and must be the contextually distinguished (by the antecedent) bearer of the name. It follows that anaphoric uses of proper names with referential antecedents are (TR-1) - and thus also (TR-2) - referential.

Descriptive uses of indexicals and proper names are neither (TR-1)- nor (TR-2)-referential for the obvious reason that their propositional contribution is, by stipulation, general - it is not an object but a distributive property. Recanati has not considered descriptive uses of proper names explicitly, but to accommodate descriptive uses of indexicals, he proposed a weakening of his theory, which I dub here (TR-3). Instead of requiring for an utterance G(t)

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[19] The example is from Barrios 2013.

where t is an indexical that there is an object x such that the utterance is true iff x satisfies G
( ), he now only requires that the interpretation be singular at the basic, non-optional level:

> (TR-3) (TR) should be interpreted as pertinent only to the basic level of
> interpretation.

Descriptive interpretation of indexicals is supposed to be optional: all indexicals must be interpreted referentially, in some cases (deictic), this is the final interpretation, for some, the interpretation may proceed by further interpretive processes to a different object or to a property (Recanati 1993, 313, 315). But since the descriptive interpretation presupposes the basic referential interpretation (Recanati 1993, 313), it should not be available if the saturation of the indexical is not possible in a context.

The amendment Recanati proposes in the formulation of his thesis applies equally well to descriptive uses of proper names, and this application serves better in supporting it. In descriptive uses of proper names which are not attributive, the propositional contribution of the proper name is a property of or contextually related to the distinguished bearer of the name. It is thus a prerequisite to understanding the utterance that the hearer must identify the relevant bearer of the name. In this sense, descriptive uses of proper names are (TR-3)-referential. Yet the same is not generally true for descriptive uses of indexicals. The difference stems from alternative ways of identifying the object whose (or related to whom) property contributes to the proposition expressed. As it is the case for identifying the index for deferred uses of indexicals, the relevant object may either be given by the linguistic meaning of the indexical used descriptively (in that case, saturation is indeed required, and Recanati's strategy works), or may be demonstrated, as exemplified by (9):

> (9) He must be a giant.

This utterance is also felicitous in contexts in which, by stipulation, no salient male is present, and demonstrates that descriptive uses do not always require saturation of the indexical and are thus not (TR-3)-referential.

Additional examples of kinds of uses not referential in either of the three senses mentioned above are anaphoric use of both indexicals and proper names based on non-referential terms, most prominently on attributively used definite descriptions, attributive uses of indexicals, especially uses of indexicals in proverbs, and predicative uses of proper names. Since the possibility of referential uses of definite descriptions made descriptions not type-referential, we should conclude that neither indexicals nor proper names are type-referential either.

If my conclusions regarding indexicals and proper names are accepted, it appears unlikely that there are any type-referential expressions in natural language. However, these conclusions only relate to the empirical aspect of Recanati's thesis and do not undermine the theoretical value of the concepts of type- and token-referentiality. By providing clear criteria of direct referentiality and by distinguishing between occasion token referentiality from the limiting case of type-referentiality, the concepts are useful theoretical tools in the study of language, akin to Kripke's concept of rigidity or Kaplan's concept of direct reference. Distinguishing between type- and token-referentiality allows for subtle distinctions among systematic uses of natural language expressions, as I hope this study has demonstrated.

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